While there are myriad benefits to conducting survey experiments, as with any type of research design, there also limitations worth considering. Most notable for our purposes concerns the tradeo↵ between internal and external validity, in that our study took place at a single place in time, such that although we can show in rich detail how ordinary citizens currently define terrorism, we are not able to extrapolate to other time periods.
Given the potential for pretreatment e↵ects (Gaines, Kuklinski and Quirk, 2007) and availability bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) , it is therefore worthwhile to contextualize the survey experiment's timing. After all, a survey experiment fielded in the days after the 9/11 attacks would likely report di↵erent understandings of terrorism than one fielded in the 1950s. It is thus valuable to explore how close the survey fielding was to highly salient incidents that could be a↵ecting the results.
We thus measured the salience of terrorism in two di↵erent ways. First, we looked at media coverage of terrorism in a twelve month window around our experiment, recording daily counts of every newspaper article on LexisNexis mentioning "terrorism" or "terrorist" from between February 17, February 17, 2016. 1 Second, we tracked public interest in terrorism using data from Google Trends, recording the popularity of the term "terrorism" in Google searches in the United
States from January 2015 to January 2016.
Figure 1(a) depicts the salience of terrorism as measured by media coverage, with each point on the scatterplot indicating the daily number of newspaper articles mentioning "terrorism" or "terrorist", overlaid with a nonparametric smoothing spline with seven knots. Figure 1 (b) depicts the salience of terrorism as measured by weekly Google search trends. In both plots, the dashed vertical line in the middle of the plot indicates the fielding of our study. As it turns out, both plots suggest roughly the same story: although there is a significant spike in salience corresponding with the Paris attacks in mid-November 2015, both newspaper coverage and Google search trends remain relatively constant throughout the rest of the year. Importantly, then, the plots show that the study's fielding did not coincide with a highly salient event that could potentially bias the findings. The top panel depicts daily counts of newspaper articles mentioning terrorism within six months of our experiment's fielding; the dark black line depicts a natural smoothing spline with seven knots. The bottom panel shows weekly Google trends data for terrorism from January 2015-January 2016. The dashed vertical line in each plot indicates the timing of our study's fielding. Both plots show stark temporary increases in terrorism salience following the Paris attacks, but that otherwise salience is fairly constant (including during the period in which the study was fielded), mitigating concerns about bias in our results. Note that because of limits on the number of results that can be displayed by Lexis-Nexis for any given time period, the results are truncated at 3000 for six of the seven days following the Paris attacks.
Conjoint randomization details
Following best practices with conjoint experiments (e.g. Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; Kertzer, Renshon and Yarhi-Milo, 2016) , we constrained the randomization to prevent implausible or prob- We should note that our experimental protocol di↵ers from traditional conjoint experiments in two ways. First, following Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015) , conjoint experiments in political science have thus far tended to be choice-based conjoints, in which participants are presented between pairs of profiles, and asked to choose between them. However, because of the purpose of our study -for which it would be problematic to present participants with two incidents, and have them decide which one is "more terrorist" than the other -we instead employed a ratings-based conjoint, in which participants are presented with only one profile at a time, and simply asked whether they consider the incident to be terrorism or not. In this way, the the experimental design more closely approximates the phenomenon in the world we are attempting to study. Second, conjoint experiments that use tabular formats randomize the order in which attributes are presented at the respondent-level to test for order e↵ects. Because we use an article format instead, our pretesting found that randomizing the order in which attributes were presented su↵ered from problems of lexical interpretability: narratives have structure, such that being told why something took place before what the thing itself was, for example, made the scenarios hard to follow. We therefore fixed the order in which the attributes were presented to the one that was the most interpretable for our participants. Although this precludes the possibility of testing for order e↵ects, it improves our inferences by more closely resembling the linguistic conventions our participants are familiar with (Grice, 1975 ).
Survey weighting
One of the main goals of this paper is to make inferences about how ordinary members of the public classify events as terrorism. Since our participants come from a convenience sample recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, it is important to think carefully about how respondents on MTurk might be fundamentally di↵erent from other types of individuals in the broader population. In this paper we use a similar weighting technique, using entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012) to reweight our sample towards standard population parameters, as presented in Table 1 , trimming the weights to reduce the impact of extreme values. 5 Because the addition of weights only change quantities of interest in survey experiments if the demographic characteristics used to generate 3 Additionally, because of our interest in whether liberals and conservatives define terrorism di↵erently, we employed a two-stage sampling strategy in which we fielded an initial version of the survey, and then produced a second version that was only visible to MTurk workers who had self-identified as conservative in an earlier, unrelated study fielded by one of the authors, thereby partially mitigating the liberal nature of the MTurk worker pool (Hu↵ and Tingley, 2015) . This allowed us to ensure that we had a su cient number of respondents in each of the demographic categories upon which we would subsequently weight. 4 For a discussion of the weights used by professional polling firms and how the types of individuals on these platforms are similar to those on MTurk, see Hu↵ and Tingley (2015) .
5 See Kertzer et al. (2014) for another application of this procedure.
6 the weights significantly interact with the study treatments, adding weights to survey experiments generally does not substantially change the results (Mutz, 2011) , and as shown in Figure 2 , our results here are no exception. The weighted estimates are substantively similar to those presented in the paper, and the results do not substantively di↵er regardless of whether weights are used. The only treatment category for which the results slightly di↵er from those in the main text is for the organization with foreign ties. However, as is discussed in the main body of the text, the substantive size of the e↵ect for this is extremely small relative to the other e↵ect sizes, such that the overall findings remain the same. Average marginal component effect (AMCE)
Grey lines indicate weighted estimates while black lines are unweighted. 8
MTurk protocol and demand e↵ects
As noted in the main text, participants in the study were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants were paid $1.50 for their participation. We also limited participation in the study to MTurk workers located in the United States, who had completed greater than 50 HITs, and whose HIT approval rate was greater than 95%. MTurk is increasingly popular for experimental research in political science, and experimental studies conducted on MTurk have been published in a variety of notable journals, including the American Political Science Review (Tomz and Weeks, 2013) , American Journal of Political Science (Healy and Lenz, 2014) , Comparative Political Studies (Charnysh, Lucas and Singh, 2014) , International Organization (Wallace, 2013) , and the Journal of Conflict Resolution (Kriner and Shen, 2013) . Nonetheless, there are two potential concerns about the use of MTurk. The first involves the composition of the sample, which we address through the use of survey weights and entropy balancing, detailed above. Additionally, because of our interest in whether liberals and conservatives define terrorism di↵erently, we employed a two-stage sampling strategy in which we fielded an initial version of the survey, and then produced a second version that was only visible to MTurk workers who had self-identified as conservative in an earlier, unrelated study fielded by one of the authors, thereby partially mitigating the liberal nature of the MTurk worker pool (Hu↵ and Tingley, 2015) .
The second concerns demand e↵ects, in that like participants in other online survey platforms, MTurk users often participate in a large number of studies, which is problematic for studies that either require naive participants (e.g. the cognitive reflection test -Frederick, 2005) , or employ commonly used experimental paradigms (Chandler, Mueller and Paolacci, 2014; Paolacci and Chandler, 2014; Krupnikov and Levine, 2014) . 6 Given both the intended purpose of our study and relative novelty of our experimental design, however, this concern does not apply here.
2 Higher-order quantities of interest
Average marginal treatment interaction e↵ects (AMTIEs)
The analysis in the main text presents Average Marginal Component E↵ects (AMCEs), the standard quantity of interest in conjoint experiments (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014) . Since the interpretation of interaction e↵ects in conjoint experiments is sensitive to the choice of the baseline category, Egami and Imai (2015) propose an alternate quantity of interest, Average Marginal Treatment Interaction E↵ects (AMTIEs). substantively large e↵ects are also detected for motivation, and the categorization of the actor;
casualties also have substantively important e↵ects, but at a lesser magnitude. In contrast, the ideology of the actor, and the target and location have relatively minor e↵ects. Two points are worth emphasizing here. First, as in the main text, we see that subjective considerations about the perpetrator matter more than many objective facts on the ground. Second, since the one-way AMTIE is equivalent to an AMCE for each of the treatment categories as a whole (rather than the levels within them), we should not be surprised we find equivalent results with either quantity. However, four of the five largest two-way AMTIE ranges involve tactics, and two of these e↵ects (the interaction between tactics and motivation, and between tactics and the categorization of the actor)
are substantively large, which we explore in greater detail in the next section. Similarly, Figure   3 (c) shows that the three-way e↵ects are extremely small, although as before, the AMTIEs with the largest e↵ect ranges tend to involve tactics (which make up the thirteen substantively largest threeway e↵ects). Finally, Figure 3 (d) summarizes the three previous panels by presenting the AMTIEs for the four largest e↵ect ranges across the one-, two-, and three-way interaction categories. In the next section, we unpack these di↵erent interactive e↵ects. 
Interaction E↵ects of Interest
The previous set of analyses illustrated in Figures 3(a) -(d) suggest that although most of the treatments in the experiment lack substantively large interaction e↵ects, there are a number of interaction e↵ects worth exploring in greater detail. We thus begin by presenting interaction e↵ects for the substantively largest two-way AMTIEs from Figure 3(b) , before turning to a broader set of interaction e↵ects of theoretical interest. Figure 4 presents the results for the interaction between the motivation of the actor and the tactics employed in the incident, the substantively largest e↵ect range of the two-way AMTIEs depicted in Figure 3 (b). Several findings are worth noting. First, and most importantly, the results reinforce the extent to which violence is seen as a necessary factor for an event to be classified as terrorism: protests are unlikely to be classified as terrorism, regardless of the motivation attributed to the actor. Second, for incidents with an unclear motivation, moving from non-violence (protests) to a violent tactic increased the likelihood an incident is classified as terrorism by over 40%. Third, incidents perpetrated by actors motivated by personal disputes are infrequently considered to be terrorism. This is consistent with the understanding of terrorism as reflecting a broader political agenda. Figure 5 presents the results for the interaction between the actor and the tactic employed in the incident, the second-largest e↵ect range of the two-way AMTIEs depicted in Figure 3(b) . The results demonstrate that much of the e↵ect heterogeneity comes from a mental illness "discount": violent incidents perpetrated by individuals with a history of mental illness are less likely to be classified as terrorism than incidents perpetrated by all other actors, regardless of the tactics employed. The results also demonstrate that while protests are similarly unlikely to be classified as terrorism, violent incidents perpetrated by more formal organizations are much more likely to be classified as terrorism than those carried out by individuals. This is indicative of the perception discussed in the paper that collectives of individuals are more likely to be acting in pursuit of a broader political agenda. The results reinforce the centrality of violent tactics and political agendas to our understanding of terrorism: protests are unlikely to be considered terrorism regardless of the motivation attributed to the actor, and attacks motivated by personal disputes are unlikely to be considered terrorism regardless of the tactics employed. Note that protests motivated by personal disputes were precluded in the experimental design as part of the randomization constraints, which is why this combination is not depicted here. 14 Figure 5 : Interaction between the tactic and actor.
Average marginal component effect (AMCE) Average marginal component effect (AMCE) The AMCEs demonstrate the importance of tactics, and bombing in particular, for the likelihood an incident is defined to be terrorism. Bombing with no casualties is statistically indistinguishable from shootings and hostage takings with ten causalities. Average marginal component effect (AMCE) 
The moderating role of attitudes towards Islam
Given recent debates about the extent to which discourses about terrorism are wrapped up in double standards against Muslims, 7 we explicitly included a "Muslim" treatment as part of our social categorization treatments. The results in the main text found a modest, but statistically significant e↵ect, in which incidents by perpetrators described as Muslim were 6% more likely to be perceived as terrorism than incidents by perpetrators described as Christian, and 8% more likely to be classified as terrorism than incidents by perpetrators for whom no social categorization was provided.
The e↵ect was small, although as Figure 10 shows below, simply looking at the average e↵ects of social categorizations belies important ideological gaps between liberals and conservatives. Two patterns are especially noteworthy. First, conservatives are more likely to classify incidents where the perpetrator is described as Muslim as terrorism than liberals. Second, liberals are more likely to classify incidents where the perpetrator is described as Christian as terrorism than conservatives.
Taken together, these findings highlight an interesting symmetrical interaction between respondents' political ideology and the identity categories of the perpetrator. com/qasim-rashid/the-terrorism-double-stan_b_8723512.html.
Haroon Moghul, "The only di↵erence between Christian gunman and a Muslim terrorist is racism", Quartz, March 29, 2016. http://qz.com/649933/ the-only-difference-between-a-christian-gunman-and-a-muslim-terrorist-is-racism/.
O r , c o n v e r s e l y , Jonathan Zimmerman, "The double standard on terrorism justifications", New York Daily News, March 28, 2016, http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/jonathan-zimmerman-double-standard-explaining-terror-article-1. 2580468.
8 Because of the small magnitude of the e↵ect, in Appendix §3.2, we test to see whether the e↵ect shrinks over time in a manner that might be indicative of social desirability bias, but fail to find evidence of it. See also Appendix §2.2, which looks for double standards in terms of the targeting of Islamic religious facilities and community centers. response options ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree"), the first three of which measure Islamoprejudice, and latter two Secular Criticism.
1. Islam and Christianity share the same universal ethical principles.
2. Islam is an archaic religion, unable to adjust to the present.
3. I think the Islamic religion and its aggressive sides predispose it towards terrorism.
4. Religion becomes a problem when humans try to take holy writing literally.
5. The strict division between church and state is a Western accomplishment that would be progress in many Islamic countries.
In the analysis below, we mean-split each scale, and present the full set of AMCEs for each subgroup. Given the theoretical work on di↵erentiating the two constructs from one another, we expect there to be heterogeneous treatment e↵ects for the Islamoprejudice measure, but not the Secular Critique one. We present the full set of results in Figures 11 and 12.
9 Figure 11 presents heterogeneous e↵ects by the Islamoprejudice measure. Importantly, individuals high in Islamoprejudice (in black)
are more likely to perceive incidents carried out by Muslims as terrorism, and significantly less likely to perceive incidents carried by Christians as terrorism. Interestingly, they also are significantly more likely to define low-casualty incidents as terrorism, and attributed motivations appear to matter less for them than for individuals who are low in Islamoprejudice. As before, though, the magnitude of the bias is relatively small, and the overall ranking of factors remains the same. In contrast in Figure   12 , individuals high in Secular Critique (in black) are no more likely to perceive attacks executed by Muslims as terrorism than individuals low in Secular Critique, although the AMCEs are positive and significant for both groups. On the whole, then, the results reconfirm the findings in the main text: while incidents carried out by Muslim perpetrators are indeed more likely to be characterized as terrorism, and the treatment e↵ect is largest amongst subgroups with negative views of Islam, the e↵ects on the whole are modest in size, and the most prejudiced respondents nonetheless appear to define events as terrorism using a similar ranking of indicators as their low-prejudice counterparts. 
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Over the past thirty years scholars have noted that there are over 200 definitions of terrorism, with each placing varying emphases on the objective facts on the ground, subjective characteristics of the actor, as well as a myriad of other actor or incident specific characteristics (Jackson, 2010; Schmid and Jongman, 1984; Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004) . In order to better understand the common elements of these numerous definitions of terrorism Schmid and Jongman (1984, 5-6) , followed by Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler (2004, 781) , conducting extensive reviews of the scholarly literature to highlight the common elements across these varying definitions. In this paper we built upon these common definitional components, paired with common debates in the popular media, to construct the typology for the types of factors we should expect to be most salient for how the public defines terrorism. How closely do these common elements of scholarly definitions map on to the relative importance for the ways in which the public relies upon varying attributes of our typology when classifying incidents as terrorism?
In order to answer this question, we compared the relative importance for how the public defines terrorism for each of the components of our typology with the common elements of scholarly definitions as characterized by Schmid and Jongman (1984, 5-6) . The results for this comparison are presented in Table 2 . The two columns on the left show each of the elements of our typology, divided into the objective characteristics and subjective characteristics of incidents, along with the one-way AMTIEs. 10 These columns allow us to directly compare the marginal importance of each of the treatment categories for determining how our respondents classified incidents as terrorism. In the two columns on the right we classified the definitional elements of terrorism from Schmid and Jongman (1984) in the corresponding attributes of our typology, along with the relative frequency with which each of these definitional elements occur. Several attributes of this comparison are striking.
First, is the role of violence as the most important category across both scholarly definitions and the ways in which the public defines terrorism. This intuitively demonstrates the central role that violence plays across both the public and academic understandings of the types of incidents we should theoretically expect to be most likely to be classified as terrorism. Interestingly, while in our analysis we deconstructed violence into its type and severity, in scholarly definitions these are pooled together in the categories of "violence" or "force." 11 This means that while we can observe that the type of violence, as exemplified by its tactic in our typology, is important for shaping how the public defines terrorism, scholarly definitions are largely silent on this distinction. In our view, considering these distinctions is an interesting future area of work for terrorism researchers. How should our definitions consider bombings or shootings for which there are no casualties?
Second, is the relative importance of subjective attributes of incidents in how both the public and scholarly definitions understand terrorism. Most prominently, are the terms "purposive, planned, and systematic" (32%) as well as "political" (65%). As we have demonstrated throughout this paper, how purposive or political a given incident is, is often fraught with ambiguity. This distinction is even more pronounced when considering incidents where the perpetrator is an individual, and there is ambiguity over whether they are mentally ill, connected to foreign organizations, or acting purposively toward some larger political objective. 12 Moving forward, in our view it is important for terrorism scholars to continue working through whether specific incidents throughout the United
States should be classified as terrorism, as well as continue to critically analyze the ways in which both the public and scholarly literature deals with ambiguities over the more subjective components of violent incidents.
Third, is that many of the definitional elements common to terrorism do not fit into our typology.
These components, along with their relative frequency, are presented in Table 3 . The types of elements that do not fit into out typology are generally those that discuss the psychological impact of terrorism, such as "fear" (51%), "threat" (47%), "psychological e↵ects" (42%), "arbitrariness" (21%), and "intimidation" (17%). The fact that these definitional components do not map on to our typology is fairly intuitive, in that many of these components are both subjective and causally downstream from the incident in itself. That is, how "fearful" or "threatened" the public is in the aftermath of a violent incident is largely caused by both the objective characteristics (type and severity of violence, target, and location) and subjective characteristics (political purposiveness, social categorization, and motivation of the actor) of the incident. These distinctions demonstrate the depth of the causal complexity and interconnectedness between the array of definitional elements for how we think about terrorism. Table 2 : The relative importance of the seven elements of our typology for how the public defines terrorism paired with the definitional elements from Schmid and Jongman (1984, 5-6) which map on to the typology. 
Carryover assumption test
One of the assumptions underlying conjoint analyses is that the results do not display over-time e↵ects, thereby enabling us to pool results across multiple rounds. Figure 13 presents AMCEs within each round, with each letter depicting a di↵erent level of the treatment (e.g. for tactics, "H" = hostage taking, "S" = shooting, and "B" = bombing), and the dashed horizontal lines depicting the AMCEs averaged across all eight rounds. The figure shows the results to be relatively stable over time: for the Motivation factor, for example, unclear motivations (depicted by the "U" in the plot) tend to hover around the cross-round AMCE of 0.2; overthrowing the government ("O") and policy change ("P") tend to have the largest e↵ects across all rounds, and so on.
The absence of longitudinal e↵ects is also substantively interesting in the case of ideology. One interpretation of the relatively modest e↵ects for Muslim actors is social desirability bias: that respondents underreport the extent to which they characterize incidents with Muslim perpetrators, because they are aware of the purpose of the study. If this were the case, one empirical implication would be that the e↵ect of the Muslim treatment should shrink over time: respondents who receive the Muslim treatment in the first round, for example, will not have observed the other levels of the treatment, but have an 80% probability of observing a non-Muslim actor in each subsequent round, such that the potential for demand e↵ects would increase. Yet the ideology panel shows that the e↵ect of the Muslim treatment remains relatively constant, thereby failing to provide evidence in support of a social desirability explanation. we should expect to be most likely to be classified as terrorism, regardless of the statistical model used. Table 11 presents predicted probabilities generated by a Support Vector Machine classifier with LASSO constraints with no weights. Predicted probabilities generated by a Linear Probability
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Model without weights are presented in Table 12 while Table 13 presents probabilities from a Linear Probability Model with weights included. Note that when using a Linear Probability Model there is a larger range of plausible values than the predicted probabilities presented in the paper, since the predicted values from the SVM are calculated using a logistic transformation. However, the rank ordering among incidents is largely the same.
6 Additional information about the media content analysis
Content analyses of newspaper coverage serve as a helpful means of further probing our findings.
As a plausibility test, we selected two events from Table 2 in the main text: an incident with a high classification rate (the shooting at Fort Hood, with a terrorism probability of 85%), and an incident with a classification rate close to 50% (the shooting at Charleston, with a terrorism probability of 46%). While we ideally would have been able to also compare these incidents with another with a low predicted probability, the low predicted-probability events generally did not garner enough media attention; we thus focus our analysis on two shootings that received a su cient level of media coverage to be able to conduct meaningful analyses.
A potentially interesting future area of further research would involve better understanding the relationship between definitions of terrorism and the substance of the debates that are sparked by these disagreements. For example, following the shooting in Charleston, part of the "debate" captured in the newspaper articles concerns the implications of the shooting for gun control policy as well as the use of the Confederate flag throughout the South. While our current measure of "terrorism debate" captures these debates over di↵erent policy domains, it raises interesting questions about the tendency of terrorist incidents to open up additional policy debates, and whether the contentiousness of debates over terrorism make these other debates more or less likely to occur (e.g. does an incident whose terrorist classification is uncertain open up space in political discourse in a way that an incident that less ambiguous does not? Future research could seek to better disentangle the substance of the debates that emerge in the aftermath of violent incidents.
Search instructions on LexisNexis
We downloaded the articles from LexisNexis using the following steps, which we document below in detail so that interested readers will be able to replicate the results:
1. Searched LexisNexis for all articles about the shootings in Fort Hood and Charleston. The search terms used allowed for articles that either mentioned the name of the shooter or the location of the incident and either the words massacre or shooting.
• The full list of search terms for Charleston was: ""Dylann Roof" OR "Charleston Shooting" OR "Charleston Church Shooting" OR "Charleston shooting" OR "Charleston church shooting" OR "Charleston Massacre" OR "Charleston Church Massacre" OR "Charleston massacre" OR "Charleston church massacre".
• The full list of search terms for Fort Hood was: "Nidal Hasan" OR "Fort Hood Shooting" OR "Fort Hood shooting" OR "Fort Hood Massacre" OR "Fort Hood massacre".
